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A B S T R A C T   
This study proposes a comprehensive model that helps improve self-comparisons and group-comparisons for 
customers to detect suspicious transactions related to money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (FT) in 
financial systems. The self-comparison is improved by establishing a more comprehensive know your customer 
(KYC) policy, adding non-transactional characteristics to obtain a set of variables that can be classified into four 
categories: inherent, product, transactional, and geographic. The group-comparison involving the clustering 
process is improved by using an innovative transaction abnormality indicator, based on the variance of the 
variables. To illustrate the way this methodology works, random samples were extracted from the data ware-
house of an important financial institution in Mexico. To train the algorithms, 26,751 and 3527 transactions and 
their features, involving natural and legal persons, respectively, were selected randomly from January 2020. To 
measure the prediction accuracy, test sets of 1000 and 600 transactions were selected randomly for natural and 
legal persons, respectively, from February 2020. The proposed model manages to decrease the proportion of false 
positives and increase accuracy when compared to the rule-based system. On reducing the false positive rate, the 
company’s costs for investigating suspicious customers also decrease significantly.   
1. Introduction 
Money laundering is the processing of income gained from criminal 
activity to hide its illegal origin (Seymour, 2008; Williams, 2009; Sobreira 
Leite, Bessa Albuquerque, & Rogerio Pinheiro, 2019; Teichmann, 2020). 
Terrorism financing is any form of financial action, support, or mediation 
that provides financial support for the activities of terrorist groups 
(Raphaeli, 2010; Romaniuk, 2014; Teichmann, 2019). These types of 
crime have generated great interest internationally because of their im-
plications for economies and financial institutions worldwide. The main 
problem is that money laundering weakens the integrity of financial sys-
tems, leads to a loss of control over a country’s economic policies, distorts 
the economy, causes instability in investments, and results in lower tax 
revenue for the government (Aluko & Bagheri, 2012; Chen et al., 2018). 
Terrorism financing, for its part, has a particularly strong impact on 
small economies. For instance, the GDP of Israel falls in response to 
terrorist threats. Investment also falls because the owners of capital 
decide to move their assets to safer countries (Sandler & Enders, 2008). 
The tourism, international trade, and financial sectors can be affected as 
well (Chen & Siems, 2004; Enders & Sandler, 2008; Enders, Sandler, & 
Parise, 1992; Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004). 
The aforementioned negative effects have led international institutions 
to implement measures and standards to prevent and combat money 
laundering and terrorism financing in financial systems. An example of this 
is FATF (The Financial Action Task Force). FATF sets the standards for the 
effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures to 
combat money laundering, terrorism financing and other threats to the 
integrity of the international financial system. Member countries and 
financial institutions, for their part, have implemented the 40 recom-
mendations made by the FATF in its standards and have developed stra-
tegies to detect these crimes. They have also agreed to relax domestic bank 
secrecy provisions when financial investigations have an international 
aspect. 
Traditional methodologies to detect money laundering and terrorism 
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financing involve computer database checks, surveillance, mail/trash 
covers, subpoenas, interviews with associates, search warrants and sub-
ject interviews. Many of these techniques are manual, which makes them 
inefficient and resource intensive. Additionally, financial institutions 
have developed systems to detect suspicious transactions based on fixed 
rules subject to certain thresholds. This approach has the disadvantage of 
generating a high proportion of false positives since the system cannot 
dynamically adjust the rule based on behavioral changes in criminals 
(Chandraeva, Amarasinghe, De Silva, Aponso, & Krishnarajah, 2020; 
Moustafa, Abd El-Megied, Sobh, & Shafea, 2015). 
In recent years, the emergence of data warehouses, the improved per-
formance of computers and the development of software packages have led 
to artificial intelligence techniques being used to overcome the deficiencies 
in the traditional methods for the detection of money laundering and 
terrorism financing (Watkins et al., 2010). Some of these techniques are 
based on the fundamental principle that any transaction that does not 
comply with the normal behavior of a customer or similar group is 
anomalous (Raza & Haider, 2011). Bearing all of this in mind, the first 
objective of this article is to propose a new indicator of abnormality for 
transactions. This uses the variance of the variables to filter the clusters 
obtained from four types of neural network. The proposed indicator will 
refine the detection task, improving on the group-comparison already 
present in the clustering process. The second objective of the article is to 
improve self-comparison by adding non-transactional characteristics to 
obtain a set of variables that can be classified into four categories: inherent, 
product, transactional and geographic. The inclusion of these new vari-
ables will improve the individual behavioral analysis since the KYC (Know 
Your Customer) policy suggested by FATF will be implemented more 
comprehensively. 
The methodology is applied to the alert systems of an important 
financial institution in Mexico. Mexico is an appropriate country for testing 
the working of methodologies to detect suspicious activities due to its large 
flow of illegal resources. According to reports from the group of experts at 
Global Financial Integrity, Mexico is the third-largest exporter of illegal 
resources after India and Russia, these making up an average of 5.4% of its 
GDP (Integrity, 2015). Most of these illegal resources come from drug 
trafficking, extortion, corruption, and tax evasion (Force, 2018b). 
After the introduction, this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the previous work related to the model proposed in this article. 
Section 3 discusses the typologies of real money laundering and terrorism 
financing cases and the methodology for their processing. Section 4 pre-
sents the computational algorithm used by the institution’s systems to 
generate alerts. Section 5 describes the main results of the proposed 
model and compares these to the results of the previous one. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes and discusses further research. 
2. Literature review and contribution 
Money laundering detection started in the 1970 s with financial in-
stitutions reporting transactions to the government (Soltani, Nguyen, 
Yang, Faghani, Yagoub, & An, 2016). Since then, most of the techniques 
used in automated banking systems have established rules with certain 
thresholds. These techniques are labor intensive and unable to detect 
money laundering when transactions are below the defined thresholds. If 
the thresholds are too low, they may also result in a high proportion of false 
positives (Yang & Wei, 2010). 
Some authors have tried to overcome the deficiencies in these rule- 
based methods by developing sequence matching and Bayesian models 
to detect money laundering. For example, in Liu, Zhang, and Zeng (2008) 
the authors use a computational approach to classify transactions as sus-
picious or normal. The data they use include transaction time, account 
number, transaction direction and transaction amount. The innovative 
contribution of this study is comparing each transaction with its historical 
trend and with peer groups. One disadvantage of this approach is that the 
detection task rests entirely on the nature of the transaction, omitting other 
important typologies related to money laundering. In Khan, Larik, Rajput, 
and Haider (2013) the authors develop a Bayesian network using the rules 
listed in the Government of Pakistan’s Anti-Money Laundering Regula-
tions, including the total credit amount, total debit amount, difference 
between the credit and debit amount and frequency of credit and debit 
transactions. They define normal behavior based on a training set created 
from the customer’s past transactions. The normal pattern established is 
then compared with the behavior of the test set to identify suspicious ac-
tivities. This proposal is again based only on transaction features and does 
not include a group comparison. 
Within machine learning, some studies examine the use of supervised 
learning in the detection of money laundering. For example, in Tang and 
Yin (2005) the authors propose a support vector machine model for the 
classification of behavior as usual or unusual based on profile features such 
as the transaction amount, transaction frequencies, business cycle, alter-
nation of business types, change of co-operating partners, etc. In Heidar-
inia, Harounabadi, and Sadeghzadeh (2014) the authors perform network 
training using a fuzzy system that can determine the riskiness of user 
behavior. The training of the model is based on the standard deviation of 
the account, free zones, interval between transactions, operations of less 
than the permitted threshold, transfers out of and into the account and the 
account type (whether it is risky or not). In Savagea, Wangb, Chouc, and 
Zhanga (2016) the authors implement a system that uses network analysis 
and supervised learning to detect suspicious groups of customers in 
financial transactions. They use two types of transaction: large cash de-
posits and international fund transfers. They establish networks with 
parties and transaction edges where both of these have attributes, 
including the name and address of the parties involved, total amount 
transferred, etc. In Álvarez-Jareño, Badal-Valero, and Pavía (2017) the 
authors use supervised algorithms such as logistic regression, decision 
trees, neural networks and random forests to detect the largest number of 
fraudulent companies, reducing, as far as possible, the number of false 
positives for companies operating correctly. For the analysis, they use the 
amounts of commercial transactions and the number of transactions. 
Finally, in Zhang and Trubey (2018) the authors use transaction data from 
a U.S. financial institution and supervised learning algorithms such as 
decision tree, random forest, support vector machine, and artificial neural 
network to detect money laundering patterns in a set of alerts. They use ten 
explanatory variables to build models based on transaction activities over a 
period. In more recent articles, Martínez-Sánchez and Cruz-García (2020) 
use historical data and tree regression to predict the risk of exposure to 
money laundering. They take the customer’s status (level of risk) as the 
dependent variable, and use the legal entity, origin, economic activity, 
seniority and contracted product variables as predictors. Jullum, Løland, 
and Bang Huseby (2020) use XGBoost and training sets of historical data 
that can be classified into three types: normal legal transactions, those 
flagged as suspicious by an internal alert system and potential money 
laundering cases reported to the authorities. They predict whether a new 
transaction should be reported considering sender/receiver information, 
their earlier behavior and their transaction history. 
These supervised methods are not suitable for most financial in-
stitutions because they require ground-truth data. Usually, the number of 
verified ML and FT cases is small compared to the number of non-verified 
cases. Additionally, most financial institutions do not have sufficiently 
detailed information from their respective intelligence units due to privacy 
policies. This makes it difficult to construct a labeled dataset and apply 
supervised algorithms. Under these circumstances, unsupervised algo-
rithms are more suitable. If, despite this, a decision is made to use super-
vised algorithms, under-sampling and over-sampling techniques, as well as 
balanced training and test sets, may be used to improve model perfor-
mance1 (Wei, Li, Cao, Ou, & Chen, 2012). 
1 In Li, Yen, Lu, and Wang (2012) it can be observed how a balance of the 
sample was needed to perform the data mining detection task due to the 
number of non-fraudulent accounts being >30 times the number of fraudulent 
ones. 
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Within unsupervised algorithms, clustering is the most frequently 
used methodology. In Liu, Qian, Mao, and Zhu (2011) the authors pro-
pose the use of a core decision tree and clustering algorithms to detect 
money laundering using key attributes such as transaction time, sender, 
receiver, frequency and transaction amount. In Cao and Do (2012) the 
authors use the attributes of bank transfer transactions and CLOPE al-
gorithms for clustering to detect money laundering in Vietnam’s 
banking industry. They use variables such as amount sent, amount 
received, number sent, number received, relationship between what is 
sent and what is received and the absolute value of the difference be-
tween the amounts sent and received. In Drezewski, Sepielak, and Fili-
pkowski (2014) the authors analyze financial flows in order to detect 
money-laundering processes. They examine the clustering of money 
transfers that fulfill the specified characteristics and then mine for 
frequent sets and sequences in the clusters found. 
These techniques take advantage of the group comparison performed 
through the clustering process. This means that the transaction behavior 
of one customer is compared with that of other customers with similar 
characteristics. This peer-group comparison is crucial for the detection 
of money laundering because one transaction may be unusual given the 
history of a customer but normal given the common movements of the 
group with similar characteristics (Jun, 2006). Other studies such as 
Deng, Roshan Joseph, Sudjianto, and Jeff Wu (2009) and Gao (2009) 
propose a more comprehensive model, incorporating not just the peer- 
group comparison through the clustering process but also self- 
comparison through variables that reflect the historical transaction 
behavior of the customer. The combination of these two comparisons is 
also seen in Liu and Zhang (2010), who propose a method that finds 
unusual clustering from time series of the transactions for each account. 
They deploy the thresholds calculated through samples using all trans-
actions in peer-group accounts. 
Despite the adequacy of these algorithms for the detection of money 
laundering when there is a lack of labeled data, efforts have been 
entirely focused on detecting this crime by analyzing the features of 
transactions alone. When there are insufficient variables in the analysis 
to obtain a complete picture of the customer’s profile, false suspicious 
activities may be identified in the clustering process. 
Little has been done to explore alternatives to the transaction vari-
ables. For example, in Wang and Yang (2007) the authors use variables 
such as economic activity, business size, location and type of financial 
product managed to assess money laundering risk using a decision tree. 
In Fronzetti Colladon and Remondi (2016) the authors use social 
network analysis to detect money laundering in medium-large factoring 
companies in Italy. They assess the risk profiles of customers involved in 
the factoring business using information from economic activity net-
works and geographical area networks, in addition to common trans-
action data such as the amount of the operation. 
In Kannan and Somasundaram (2017) the authors use an 
autoregressive-based outlier algorithm to reduce computational 
complexity in the detection of money laundering activities. They 
incorporate variables including customer and business type, account 
ownership and transaction features. 
As for terrorism financing, this topic was added to the FATF rec-
ommendations on October 1, 2001, immediately after the 9–11 attacks 
in America, triggering strict regulations aimed at preventing terrorism 
financing in each country. Despite this heavy regulation, the literature 
review highlighted the shortage of work on the use of artificial intelli-
gence to detect the movements of money in financial institutions 
destined for terrorism financing. One of the works indirectly related to 
financial systems is that by Koschade (2006) where the author imple-
ments a social network analysis for the Jemaah Islamiyah cell to un-
derstand its communication patterns and structure and predict the likely 
outcomes of terrorist cells. In Ozgul, Erdem, and Bowerman (2009) the 
authors identify cohesive clusters of generalized events. They use this to 
match known terrorist groups to these clusters and then finally predict 
which known terrorist group is the perpetuator of an unsolved crime. 
They use datasets of terrorist events in a province of Turkey where un-
solved and solved crimes are grouped together. In Gohar, Wasi, and 
Usman (2014) the authors propose four classification techniques to 
detect terrorist groups, using as attributes the month, city, country, 
weapon type, attack type, target and group name. They applied the 
models to open data sourced from the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism of the University of Maryland 
in USA. In Saidi, Trabelsi, and Ghazela (2018) the authors use clustering 
techniques to detect cyber terrorist groups, using attributes such as 
identification, date of birth, marital status, religion, social background, 
position in the organization, role in terrorist incidents, teacher and ar-
rest dates. They used the network data in the John Jay ARTIS Trans-
national Terrorism Database, which identify the connections between 
individuals in certain attack networks and their roles in given terrorist 
organizations. 
Since 2001, FATF has established international standards aimed at 
preventing the crimes of both money laundering and financing 
terrorism. According to Maitland, Kim-Kwang, and Lin (2011), these 
crimes should not be treated as separate events since they increasingly 
converge and share many typologies, techniques, and trends for 
obtaining and manipulating resources in financial systems to create 
terror or launder money. An example of this has been observed in in-
ternational criminal groups that are no longer dedicated only to money 
laundering but also provide logistical and other support to terrorists, 
foreign intelligence services, and foreign governments, all with interests 
that strongly conflict with those of U.S. national security (Maitland 
et al., 2011; Teichmann, 2019). 
From the above, the following gaps can be identified in the field of 
machine learning methodologies to detect suspicious transactions 
related to money laundering and terrorism financing: 
a. The inclusion of non-transactional variables has not been suffi-
ciently explored. This omits important typologies appearing in FATF 
reports, such as type of customer, customer segment, common address, 
whether the customer has operations with the government, age, source 
of income, nationality, state of residence, state of operation, corruption 
rate, crime incidence rate, geographical zones related to criminal car-
tels, whether the person is politically exposed, length of relationship 
with the institution, channel, etc. 
b. The customer’s self-comparison has been limited to the historical 
behavior of transaction variables such as frequency and amount, 
excluding variables such as those mentioned in the previous point that 
can improve the individual behavioral analysis. FATF recommendation 
10 establishes the importance of implementing the “know your 
customer” (KYC) policy to effectively identify transactions related to 
money laundering or terrorism financing. This approach is based on the 
idea that by knowing the customer well a financial institution can 
identify risk indicators, meaning that in turn it can take steps to mitigate 
these and reduce money laundering and terrorism financing vulnera-
bilities (Force, 2013b). If only transaction features are considered, it is 
impossible to obtain a complete picture of the customer’s profile. 
c. The group comparison has been restricted to that found naturally 
through the clustering process. Alternatively, we can find grouping 
using a few similar categorical features to detect suspicious activities, 
leaving out elements such as the variance of the variables involved in the 
dataset despite the fact that such elements can identify signs of atypical 
behavior. 
d. To the best of our knowledge, there is nothing in the literature 
regarding the specific use of machine learning algorithms to track 
terrorism financing in financial institutions. 
With this in mind, we propose a comprehensive model to detect 
money laundering and terrorism financing that includes the following 
contributions:  
a) It includes additional non-transactional customer, product and 
geographic variables that were absent from previous studies, 
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allowing for a more complete KYC policy and an improvement on the 
individual comparison.  
b) It introduces an indicator of abnormality based on the variance of the 
variables to improve the group comparison already present in the 
clustering process. The interesting feature of this indicator is that its 
parameters will update themselves based on the criminals’ behavior. 
c) It illustrates how detecting terrorism resources in financial in-
stitutions can be carried out using machine learning techniques. 
3. Variables and methodology 
3.1. Typologies involved in the crimes of money laundering and terrorism 
financing 
These are the methods, techniques, characteristics, and trends pre-
sent in ML and FT around the world. The typologies suggested in this 
study for inclusion come from those described in FATF reports, scientific 
articles and the financial intelligence units (FIU) of each country. For 
this study, the typologies produced by the regulatory authority of 
Mexico will be of special relevance since the analysis is developed in the 
context of that country. A brief explanation of the trends and typologies 
is given below. 
3.1.1. Type of customer 
Legal entities are more likely to be involved in money laundering 
operations and for greater amounts since private companies can use tax 
evasion as a method to launder money (Secretariat of Finance and Public 
Credit, 20162; Spreutels & Grijseels, 2000). In contrast, most customers 
involved in the crime of terrorism financing are individuals, civilians 
with their own sources of funding, from relatives or terrorist organiza-
tions (FATF, 2008b). 
The presence of corruption makes legal entities riskier than natural 
persons when it comes to money laundering and terrorism financing. 
Legal entities can use fictitious associations to launder money from 
crime and use these resources for terrorist activities (Force, 2012; 
Guardian, 2016; Jancsics, 2018). 
3.1.2. Customer Segment 
Customer segments are groups of individuals who share similar 
characteristics. Corruption accompanied by laundering through ficti-
tious associations is behavior normally associated with politicians, 
heads of state and dictators (Obermaier & Obermayer, 2016). Corrupt 
politicians and government officials also use fictitious companies in 
their own countries to facilitate illegal transactions (Jancsics, 2017). 
Therefore, customer segments in financial institutions associated with 
government bodies are considered risky in relation to money laun-
dering. As for terrorism, religion is an important factor to consider. The 
ideas and ideologies in religious doctrine may encourage people to 
commit terrorist activities (Pratt, 2010). Thus, customer segments cor-
responding to religious groups are risky in relation to terrorism. 
3.1.3. Politically exposed people 
Politically exposed people can attempt to launder money from illegal 
bribes and other income directly related to corruption. They can also be 
involved in embezzlement or the direct theft of assets from political 
parties and unions, as well as tax fraud. In certain cases, politically 
exposed people may be directly involved in other types of illegal ac-
tivity, such as organized crime or drug trafficking (Force, 2004). Various 
case studies have found that politically exposed persons can use their 
privileged position to carry out activities related to terrorism financing 
(Force, 2013c). The same studies also mention that politically exposed 
people are more likely to be involved in corruption and link this 
behavior to money laundering and terrorism activities. 
3.1.4. Economic activity 
The Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (2016) document 
mentions that economic activity is an important variable to consider in 
risk assessment models in terms of exposure to ML and FT. It provides a 
list of vulnerable economic activities identified in the cases dealt with by 
the FIU, such as car purchases, handling of credit cards with an average 
amount of between 5000 and 10,000 USD, buying and selling properties, 
etc. The Force (2012) report establishes that the area of economic ac-
tivity associated with the transaction can indicate a money laundering 
risk. This report considers risky activities to be those related to the 
extraction of natural resources, public procurement, the national de-
fense industry, healthcare, large infrastructure projects and in some 
cases the privatization of public institutions or companies. In addition, 
activities such as charitable organizations, business ownership, criminal 
activities, government positions, drug trafficking, the financial sector 
and cash messengers can be directly related to terrorism financing ac-
cording to the Force (2008b) report. 
3.1.5. Relationship duration 
In its recommendations, FATF stresses how important it is for 
financial institutions to implement a “Know Your Customer” Policy 
(Force, 2017). It argues that a strong KYC policy could reduce money 
laundering and terrorism financing vulnerabilities. Based on this policy, 
it is natural to think that customers with longer financial relationships 
with an institution will be better known to it and, thus, less risky. 
3.1.6. Age 
The age of individuals and the time since incorporation of legal en-
tities are variables constantly mentioned in the Secretariat of Finance 
and Public Credit (2016) document. Here it mentions that young low- 
profile shareholders and recently created companies (less than 5 years 
old) are frequently observed in cases of confirmed money laundering. 
According to Force (2015), 3 out of every 4 individuals who traveled to 
the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq in 2014 were aged between 20 and 
30 years old. Another study mentions that the average age of the Ben-
galis was 24.4 (Lee, 2011). The Bengalis were a group of individuals who 
shared many similar characteristics with the terrorists described in the 
literature on this topic. Therefore, it is natural to think that individuals 
between 20 and 30 years of age are more likely to be involved in 
terrorism. Regarding corruption, in Torgler and Valev (2006) the au-
thors show that the older people are, the lower their tolerance of cor-
ruption. The study was carried out by age group, 18–26, 27–35, 36–44, 
45–53, 54–62 and 63–71. Groups 18–26, 27–35 show greater tolerance 
of corruption. This supports the idea that individuals between 20 and 30 
years of age are risky in relation to money laundering and terrorism 
financing. 
3.1.7. Source of income 
This indicator is related to the economic activity of the customer. 
Thus, a source of income from a risky economic activity (of those listed 
above) will be a money laundering risk. According to Force (2015) the 
financial requirements to maintain a terrorist network are generally 
high. The most common sources of income include money from the legal 
employment of members, donations from private companies, legitimate 
business enterprises and government sponsorship, along with criminal 
acts such as financial fraud, bank robbery and smuggling. Therefore, any 
source of income related to the above is considered risky with regard to 
terrorism financing. 
3.1.8. Nationality 
According to some FATF reports, the nationalities considered to be 
risky in relation to money laundering are those of countries identified as 
2 The Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit published in 2016 the First 
National Risk Assessment through the Financial Intelligence Unit in Mexico. 
This report shows the methods, techniques, and typologies identified in 
confirmed cases of money laundering and financing of terrorism. 
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having low taxation regimes, those designated by FATF as non-cooperating 
or with significant deficiencies in the implementation of a preventive 
regime, and others with high levels of crime, the presence of organized 
crime or a high prevalence of corruption. With regard to terrorism 
financing, some of the main terrorist organizations now blacklisted in the 
United States are Islamic State, Boko Haram, Al Shebab, Al Qaeda, Haqqani 
Network, Hamas, Hezbollah, Forces Revolutionary Arms of Colombia, 
National Liberation Army, Party of the Workers of Kurdistan and Fatah Al 
Sham Front (Ex Nusra Front). Any nationality linked to these terrorist 
groups is considered risky. 
3.1.9. Product Type 
The Force (2013a) and Force (2014) reports provide some examples of 
the characteristics of banking products and sub-products that may increase 
the risk of ML/FT: 
Retail banking: high volume of transactions, high-value transactions, 
wide diversity of services. 
Asset management: confidentiality, difficulty in identifying the 
beneficial owner, use of off-shore vehicles, complexity of products, 
multiplicity of jurisdictions. 
Investment banking: transfer of assets between parties, exchange for 
cash or other assets, access to global markets. 
Correspondent banking: high-value transactions, limited informa-
tion regarding the sender and source of the funds, lack of information 
on the actual owner of the counterpart/correspondent intermediary. 
The report by the Wolfsberg Group (2006) identifies the following as 
services that potentially represent a greater risk: 
International correspondent banking services 
International private banking services 
Services that involve cash or the purchase or delivery of precious 
metals 
Some additional attributes of products and sub-products that are 
considered relevant are: 
Possibility of cancellation, refund or advance payment. 
Accessibility through remote channels (e.g., websites). 
Allow transactions with precious stones or metals, fine jewelry or 
watches. 
Allow ATM withdrawals. 
Allow the transfer of funds 
3.1.10. Transaction Type 
The Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (2016) report mentions 
international transfers, checks, cash withdrawals, and the purchase and 
sale of foreign currency as the most common type of operation in money 
laundering cases dealt with by the FIU. The Force (2012) report also con-
firms these operations as the most common in money laundering cases 
when corruption is present. The Force (2015) document mentions inter-
national transfers of funds and movements of cash as being those most used 
by terrorist groups. 
3.1.11. Monetary instrument 
Money launderers “place” illegal funds using a variety of techniques, 
including depositing cash in bank accounts and using cash to buy high- 
value assets, such as land, property and luxury items (Buchanan, 2004). 
Cash is the most frequently used monetary instrument in criminal activities 
and corruption because it provides anonymity and avoids any auditing of 
transactions (Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit, 2016). Due to this, it 
is considered the riskiest monetary instrument. Electronic transfers are 
considered a medium risk because, despite the high volume of operations, 
they are not anonymous and are easily traceable. Documents are consid-
ered low-risk monetary instruments. As for terrorism, cash is the most 
common monetary instrument transferred from one terrorist group to 
another. Virtual currencies such as bitcoin have also attracted the attention 
of several criminal groups and may pose a risk in relation to FT. This 
technology allows the anonymous transfer of funds internationally (Force, 
2015; Frick, 2019; Ibrahim, 2019). 
3.1.12. Currency 
For many years the US dollar has been the currency most commonly 
used in international trade due to its high acceptance and convertibility. It 
is estimated that more than half of all US dollar bills and coins circulate 
outside the United States. That is why it is natural to think that the US dollar 
would be the most used currency in illegal transactions (Gopinath & Stein, 
2018). In addition, the euro appears to be heavily used in illegal operations 
due to its common use in the market. The US dollar and euro are also found 
to be the most widely used foreign currencies in cases of money laundering 
analyzed in countries such as Mexico (Secretariat of Finance and Public 
Credit, 2016). 
As for terrorism, the Force (2013d) report mentions that the currencies 
most used by criminal groups linked to terrorism are the euro, dollar and 
Russian ruble. Also, terrorist organizations use various means of financing 
to boost their campaigns and recruit members. For example, in an open 
source investigation, an ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levante) propa-
ganda website was used to request bitcoin donations. Bitcoin technology 
prevents the identification of the owner of bitcoin addresses. In Israel it was 
found that, through the support of third parties, terrorist organizations 
made payments to people arrested in the country. These payments 
amounted to tens of thousands of ILS (Israeli New Shekel) and were a 
reward received by individuals and their families for committing terrorist 
acts and continuing to promote the activities of the terrorist organization 
(Force, 2018a). 
3.1.13. Channels 
Some distribution channels have characteristics that expose the entity 
to a greater risk of ML and FT. These characteristics are non-face-to-face 
registration, operation through third parties, user anonymity, fast trans-
actions, limited human intervention, a high number of transactions and 
international presence. Criminals have demonstrated adaptability and 
opportunism in finding new channels to launder the proceeds from their 
illegal activities and to finance terrorism. As the internet increasingly be-
comes a worldwide phenomenon, commercial websites and internet pay-
ment systems are potentially subject to a wide range of risks and 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by criminal organizations and terrorist 
groups, as mentioned in the Force (2008a) document. 
3.1.14. Geographic zone 
Although many financial institutions may have detected risk areas 
based on their historical information, other related typologies can be 
observed. For example, the impact of terrorist events may be greater for 
countries with larger populations because there are more people to 
intimidate (Sandler & Enders, 2008). In addition, several features can 
make a specific geographic zone more vulnerable to money laundering and 
terrorism financing. Some of these features are the corruption prevalence 
rate, crime incidence rate, marginalization index, Gini index, access and 
use of financial services, peace index and the average number of active 
cartels or criminal groups. 
3.1.15. Other typologies 
Other variables with important typologies related to ML and FT 
include: whether the customer shares a physical address with another 
customer, amount of transactions, frequency of operations, volatility in the 
amount and number of transactions, asset turnover, whether legal persons 
have a common representative, whether customers have operations with 
the government and whether the relationship between companies makes 
economic sense. 
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3.2. Methodology 
The shortage of information on historical money laundering and 
terrorism financing cases means that it is appropriate to treat them as 
latent variables3. As explained in section 2, unsupervised algorithms are 
the most suitable models to process the typologies related to the latent 
crimes of ML and FT. 
In this research, the proposed methodology involves three phases, as 
shown in Fig. 1: 
In Phase I, risk metrics are assigned to the variables following the 
fuzzy logic and typologies described in Section 2. Then in phase II, four 
unsupervised algorithms are used to form risk clusters. Finally, in phase 
III the riskiest cluster identified by the algorithm with the best perfor-
mance will be filtered using an indicator of abnormality based on the 
variance of the variables. A more detailed explanation of these phases is 
given below. 
3.2.1. Phase I—assigning risk metrics using fuzzy logic and typologies 
Fuzzy logic is applied to the process of defining risk metrics to deal 
with the uncertainty that could arise when knowledge in the chain of 
reasoning is missing, more detailed typologies are not identified, or data 
is incomplete or inaccurate. 
The process is the following: 
First, compliance officers, crime analysts, and fraud detection com-
mittees assign a risk metric rv ∈ N to a certain value ̋ v˝ of the variable 
x. For example, the “type of currency” variable can take the values USD 
dollar, Mexican peso, Chinese yuan, euro, etc., and can vary from one 
customer to another. The risk metric for each of these values is deter-
mined according to the typologies described in Section 3.2. So, the 
riskier the currency, the higher the assigned risk metric. 
Then, the same panel of experts decides the level of uncertainty α ∈
N for each risk metric. Thus, the risk metric for each value of the vari-
able x will be given by the fuzzy rule in the interval [rv − α, rv + α]. The 
fuzzy rule will be generated by the continuous uniform distribution with 
mean “rv” and variance α
2
3 . 
The value α models the uncertainty present in the variable. The 
above fuzzy rule, in canonical form following Zadeh (1983), is expressed 
as follows: 
cf=Δ If var(x)rv ∕= 0 then r
x
v ∈ [rv − α, rv + α] where var(x)rv is the 
variance of x with the risk metric rv assigned and rxv is the risk with 
uncertainty assigned to each value of x. 
When fuzzy logic is applied, a range of probable values for the risk 
metric are obtained. 
3.2.2. Phase II—unsupervised clustering and quality 
Once the risk metrics have been assigned a level of uncertainty, strict 
competitive learning, self-organizing-map, C-means and neural gas are 
used for the clustering process. These are unsupervised algorithms 
commonly used in a neural network approach (Du, 2010), 
A brief explanation of these algorithms is the following, 
Strict Competitive Learning: This is a two-layer neural network that 
finds the centroids ck of the clusters, minimizing the Euclidean distance 
between these centroids and the input vectors yp. 
Self-Organizing-Map: This algorithm calculates the Euclidean distance 
between the neuron k and the input vector yp finding the winning 
neuron w by the nearest-neighbor rule. When the winning neuron is 
found, all neurons are updated using the Kohonen learning rule. 
C-Means: This neural network finds the centroids ck of the clusters, 
minimizing the average distance between the input vectors yp and the 
centroids. 
Neural Gas: This algorithm uses neighborhood ranking to find the 
centroids ck. It calculates the Euclidean distance between the input 
vectors yp and the centroids to find the neighborhood rank. Each neuron 
is updated according to its rank, which can range from 0 to K − 1. 
Where p = 1,2, ...,m and k = 1, 2, ..., K; m is the number of obser-
vations and K the number of clusters. 
Internal validation is used to select the clustering technique that 
performs best. The compactness and separation of the clusters in each 
technique will be assessed. Compactness measures how closely the input 
vectors yp are grouped in the cluster and separation measures how 
distant (far away) the clusters are from each other. In the literature re-
view, several techniques were identified that can be used to evaluate 
these attributes simultaneously, such as the Calinski-Harabasz index 
(CH), I Index (I), Dunńs Indices (D), SilhoutTe Index (S) and Davis- 
Bouldin Index (DB) (Hassani & Seidl, 2017). For the purposes of this 
study, the CH index will be used due to its high level of interpretability. 














where D is the input dataset, m is the number of points in D, g is the 
center of the whole dataset D, K is the number of clusters, ck is the center 
of cluster Ck and d is the distance between two points. The numerator 
expresses the degree of separation and the denominator the level of 
compactness. The higher the index, the greater the quality of the clus-
tering technique. 
3.2.3. Phase III—implementation of an abnormality indicator to filter the 
riskiest cluster 
After performing the clustering process and identifying the riskiest 
cluster, an indicator of abnormality is applied. The purpose of this in-
dicator is to detect any abnormal behavior that signals the presence of 
crime. According to Berliner (1955), crime is a form of social deviation 
that can include mental abnormality. In financial institutions, the 
detection of abnormal financial behavior is based on two types of 
comparisons, self-comparison and peer-group comparison (Tianqing, 
2006). Self-comparison consists of comparing the behavior of a certain 
individual with their own history to identify any unusual behavior. In 
contrast, peer group comparison consists of comparing the behavior of 
one individual with that of a similar group. Self-comparison can be 
performed by including the standard deviation of the amounts and op-
erations in a certain period. This can then be improved by considering a 
comprehensive set of variables that can provide a complete picture of 
the customerś profile. In addition, when clustering techniques are used, 
the peer-group comparison is performed naturally during the clustering 
process since this identifies distance-based outliers, which are in-
dividuals who lie farther from their cluster. An issue with these tech-
niques is that they do not identify atypical customer behavior that could 
however be recognized through examining atypical movements in the 
characteristics of transactions over a certain time period or in a partic-
ular economic environment, geographic zone or group. For example, in 
Mexico the currencies most used by customers are the Mexican peso, the 
US dollar because of its proximity to the United States and the Euro 
because of the size of the European economy. If some individuals were to 
suddenly perform transactions in Russian rubles or Chinese yuans, the 
common pattern would break and the chances of these transactions 
being suspicious would increase. In this case, the variance of the cur-
rency variable would increase in the period under analysis and become a 
relevant variable in the detection of crime. To give another example, the 
common pattern over a period could be the use of debit and credit 
products by individuals. The sudden use of a dollar account could trigger 
an alert, and the product variable would become relevant because of the 
variance. 
With this in mind, an indicator of abnormality that assigns weights in 
accordance with the variances of the variables is proposed and this will 
3 Treating money laundering and terrorism financing as latent variables does 
not mean that they do not exist, but rather that the number of confirmed cases 
of these crimes is very small compared to the total. 
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be used to further filter the results from the riskiest cluster4. 
The construction of the indicator of abnormality is as follows, 
Let x1, x2,⋯, xn be n variables with the risk metrics and uncertainty 
already assigned for m observations. When applying principal compo-
nent analysis, a set of ncomponents ordered from highest to lowest 
variance is generated, that is, 
Z = {z1, z2,⋯zn/var(z1) > var(z2) > ⋯ > var(zn)} (2) 
The resulting components will be a linear combination of the original 
variables, that is, 
z1 = a1,1x1 + a1,2x2 + ⋯ + a1,nxn
z2 = a2,1x1 + a2,2x2 + ⋯ + a2,nxn
zn = an,1x1 + an,2x2 + ⋯ + an,nxn
(3) 
The coefficient vector ai = (ai,1, ai,2,⋯, ai,n) is the eigenvector of the 
variance–covariance matrix that maximizes the variance of component 
zi and whose module is equal to 1. Each component will have a variance 
equal to the eigenvalue associated with its own load vector, that is, 
var(zi) = λi. 
From the total components generated, only those whose proportion 
















The number of components selected is expected to be less than the 
total number, q<n. 
The property that emerges from the spectral decomposition will be 
used to construct the indicator of abnormality. That is, the square of the 
charges of the eigenvector ai associated with the xj represents the 











When considering some of the terms in the expression above, let us 
say q terms, the sum is called communality, which shows the amount of 
variance accounted for by the q selected components. With these com-
munalities it is possible to construct an indicator for a certain observa-















































It can be seen that the variables are weighted using their commu-
nalities and the total variance of the selected components. Thus, the 
more representative the cumulative variance of the components, the 
greater the communalities of the original variables. This means that 
variables with large variances will reflect large communalities in the 
indicator. 
The latter can also be seen in the decomposition of the variance of the 
components, as shown below, 



















Thus, an indicator of abnormality can be constructed for each p 
observation in the dataset and this contains weights that reflect the 
variances of the original variables. These weights will update themselves 
according to the atypicality and fluctuations of the variables in the 
period under analysis. The greater the variance of the variables, the 
greater the atypical behavior. Similar logic is used in financial markets 
where risk is associated with the variance in the value of a portfolio 
(Engle, 2004). It is important to note that the square of the loadings of 
the eigenvectors produces weights that allow us to better differentiate 
the effects of abnormality of the variables and therefore reduce ambi-
guity in the results. Another advantage is that by selecting q compo-
nents, the information on the original variables is represented through a 
smaller number of variables in the abnormality indicator. This is helpful 
when a large number of variables are considered in the analysis. 
Fig. 1. Methodology diagram. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
4 A similar filtering process is suggested by the authors in Larik and Haider 
(2011) but with an anomaly index based only on distances and transaction 
features. 
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The indicator of abnormality is used for money laundering and 
terrorism financing. It can be seen that because the norm of the eigen-
vectors is equal to 1, the squares of the eigenvector loadings are on a 
scale from 0 to 1, thus if the metrics are assigned in the interval [0,100] 
the indicator of abnormality will be between 0 and 100. 
4. Data processing 
The idea behind the proposed methodology is to track ML and FT at 
the transactional level, daily and in real time. This methodology is 
currently run in an important financial institution in Mexico with mil-
lions of daily transactions. To illustrate how this methodology works, 
random samples were extracted from the data warehouse of this 
Mexican institution. To train the algorithms, 26,751 and 3527 trans-
actions, with their associated features, were selected randomly from 
January 2020 for natural and legal persons, respectively. To measure the 
prediction accuracy, test sets of 1000 and 600 transactions were selected 
randomly from February 2020 for natural and legal persons, respec-
tively. The samples of 1000 and 600 were the first transactions after the 
final transaction in the training sets. 
The detection system works by connecting the code in Python and 
the data warehouse. It pulls the information from the data warehouse 
into the Python environment and develops the following algorithm. 
Table 1 
In the country being analyzed, payment periods are biweekly (15 
days approximately), made in the middle and at the end of the month. A 
month (43,200 min approximately) is considered the optimal period to 
train the algorithm and capture some anomalous behavior by customers 
since it includes two biweekly periods in which natural and legal persons 
are responsible for important cash inflows and outflows using different 
financial means. 
Table 2 shows the attributes/variables of customers’ transactions 
extracted from the data warehouse to feed the model. These attributes 
are considered according to the variables and typologies described in 
Section 3.1. 
15 days is the minimum time needed to guarantee that the trans-
actional variables include amounts and operations that take place at 
least once biweekly. 
Tables 3 and 4 show some descriptive statistics on the risk metrics 
assigned to the training and test samples. For this analysis, the compli-
ance experts assigned final metrics of between 0 and 100, to obtain a 
score in the same interval. 
4.1. Geographical risk index 
The state of operation and residency metrics were assigned according 
to a risk index constructed using Mexican indicators such as the cor-
ruption rate, Gini index, peace index, criminality rate, access and use of 
financial services and the average number of active cartels. 
The prevalence of corruption rate expresses the number of in-
dividuals involved in an act of corruption per 100,000 inhabitants and 
has been generated by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(NISG) since 2013. The crime incidence rate expresses the number of 
crimes that have occurred among people aged 18 or over per 100,000 
inhabitants and it has also been generated by the NISG since 2010. The 
marginalization index expresses the intensity of marginalization 
considering various socio-economic indicators and it has been generated 
by the National Population Council since 1990. The Gini index expresses 
the level of economic inequality in society and has been calculated by 
the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy 
Table 1 
The algorithm in the system.  
1. Take the transactional analysis (transaction of interest) and identify 
the time at which it was performed    
2. Determine whether the person is legal or natural to focus on that 
group of customers    
3. Read all transactions made in the last 43,200 min (one month) 
starting from the transaction of interest    
4. Assign the risk metrics using fuzzy logic and the typologies 
explained in section 2    
5. Run Principal Component Analysis through a centered SVD of the 
covariance matrix     
5.1 Detect the components that account 
for at least 80% of the variance    
5.2 Extract the variance of the selected 
components and their associated 
eigenvectors    
5.3 Determine the communalities and the 
weights of the variables in the indicator of 
abnormality   
6. Identify the time of the transactional analysis (transaction of 
interest)    
7. Cluster the transactions, including the transaction of interest, made 
in the last 43,200 min (one month) starting from the time of this 
transaction, using the aforementioned neural network techniques    
8. Take the transactional analysis again    
9. If the analyzed transaction is in the riskiest cluster     
9.1 Then, apply the indicator of 
abnormality     
9.1.1 If the value of the 
indicator of abnormality is 
>66.66     
9.1.1.1 Then, classify it as 
risky and trigger an alert    
9.1.1.2 Otherwise, classify it 
as not risky and do not trigger 
an alert  
9.2 Otherwise, classify the transaction as 
not risky and do not trigger an alert   
10. Take the next transaction to be analyzed    
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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(NCESDP) since 2010. The statistics on the use of and access to financial 
services have been generated by the National Banking and Securities 
Commission (NBSC) since December 2009. Access refers to the pene-
tration of the financial system in terms of the infrastructure available to 
offer financial services and products, that is, to the points of contact 
between the institutions (access channels) and the population, from a 
supply perspective. Use refers to the purchase or contracting, by the 
population, of one or more financial products or services, as well as to 
the frequency with which these are used. This refers to the demand for 
financial services, which, in turn, reflects the behavior and needs of the 
population. The peace index is an indicator that reflects the measure of 
peace in a given region. It has been calculated in recent years by the 
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The average number of active 
cartels is calculated on the basis of the number of active cartels in each 
six-year period generated by the Attorney General’s Office through the 
Law on Transparency and Access to Information. It has been generated 
since the six-year period beginning in 1976. These indicators are used to 
estimate a state risk index for Money Laundering and Terrorism 
Financing. It is based on the hypothesis that a higher value of these 
indicators results in a greater risk of exposure to ML/FT crimes5. Fig. 2 
shows the heat map of the estimated geographical risk index by state in 
Mexico. 
5. Results 
The traditional method used by the financial institution to detect ML 
and FT consists of a system of rules involving certain thresholds. For 
each transaction, the system produces a score between 0 and 100 to 
evaluate the risk of the customer. The risk thresholds used by the 
financial institution are from 0 to 33.33 for low risk, from 33.33 to 66.66 
for medium risk and from 66.66 upward for high risk. If the customers 
receive a score of 66.66 or higher for their transaction, they are classi-
fied as risky and suspicious and their case is sent to the Financial In-
telligence Unit (FIU). The FIU then oversees the conducting of a more 
rigorous investigation. The model proposed in this article is adapted to 
the institution’s own risk scale, following the same logic to ensure it is 
comparable. The value of 66.66 has been retained as the abnormality 
threshold. This is possible due to the high detection precision registered 
in the total population of transactions. The accuracy of this threshold is 
constantly monitored to detect possible changes over time. 
To extend the comparison, the thresholds of 50 and 75 are estab-
lished in addition to the official threshold of 66.66. Customers were 
separated into two groups of people with similar characteristics: natural 
and legal persons. Test sets incorporated 129 and 241 cases from the 
year 2019 that had already been confirmed as money laundering and 
that involved natural and legal persons, respectively. The confirmed 
cases are mainly related to acts of corruption, tax evasion, phantom 
companies and counterfeiting. 
Regarding terrorism, no cases have been reported in Mexico. No 
international terrorist group has expressed interest in attacking national 
or foreign interests. The risk of terrorism financing remains latent and is 
based on the fact that Mexico, due to its geographical position, could be 
used as a logistical, operational or financial platform to attack the 
United States. As a result, the test sets for the models being used to detect 
terrorism financing did not contain any real cases. Instead, they included 
27 and 25 cases, involving natural and legal persons, respectively, 
already confirmed as being linked to organized crime and cartels, 
collected between 2015 and 2019. The cases related to organized crime 
and cartels were used as a proxy for terrorism financing based on the 
strong similarities and relationships that may exist between them 
(Shelley & Picarelli, 2005; Hausken & Gupta, 2015; Monteleone, 2016). 
Table 5 shows the CH index for the different clustering algorithms. It 
can be observed that, for the selected samples, the algorithm with the 
best clustering quality based on compactness and separation is C-Means. 
Thus, the C-Means algorithm is used for the clustering process. 
The following tables show the confusion matrix for the different 
scenarios: 
Table 6 shows that for the detection of money laundering by natural 
persons, the proposed model produces far fewer false positives than the 
current model for all three thresholds. The same pattern is observed for 
legal persons in Table 7. 
Tables 8 and 9 show that the proposed model produces far fewer false 
positives than the current model for the threshold of 50. For the rest of 
the thresholds, the two models perform similarly. It is interesting to note 
that the algorithms begin to identify criminal cases up to the threshold of 
50. This reflects the fact that the algorithms are designed using terrorism 
Table 2 
Key Variables of the Integral Model.  
Variable Description 
Client 
Type of Client Refers to legal or natural person 
Age Age of the client at the moment of the transaction 
Source of Income Main source of income. This can be salary, commissions, 
income from sales, etc. 
Nationality Nationality of the client 
Sense of Operativity Indicates whether the salary/income from sales matches 
the operations of the client 
Operations with the 
government 
Indicates whether the transaction is related to the 
government 
Common Address Refers to whether the client has an address shared with 
another one 
Time of Relationship Years of financial relationship with the institution 
Client Segment The financial segment in which the client belongs 
Politically Exposed 
Person 
Refers to whether the client is politically exposed or not 




Indicates whether the client has appeared in the 
suspicious activity report in the last month  
Product or Service 
Type of Product Product related to the client’s transaction 
Type of Subproduct Subproduct related to the client’s transaction  
Transactions 
Type of Transaction Type of operation performed by the client 
Currency Currency used in the operation 
Monetary Instrument Monetary instrument used in the transaction 
Channel Channel through which the transaction was made 
Volatility of Amount Standard deviation of the amount involved in the client’s 
transactions in the last 15 days 
Volatility of Operations Standard deviation of the operations made by the client 
in the last 15 days 
Sum of Sending The total amount of money sent in the last 15 days in 
Mexican pesos 
Sum of Receiving The total amount of money received in the last 15 days in 
Mexican pesos 
Num. of Sending The total number of transactions sent in the last 15 days 
Num. of Receiving The total number of transactions received in the last 
15 days 
R-S Sum number received-Sum number sent (number of 
transactions) 
A-A Amount of transaction-average of transaction amounts in 
the last 15 days  
Geographic Zones 
State of Residency State where the client lived at the moment of the 
transaction 
State of Operation State where the client performed the transaction 
Municipality of 
Residency 




Municipality where the client performed the transaction 
Country of Residency Country where the client lives at the moment of the 
transaction 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
5 Because some series were not generated in the same periods or there was no 
information for 2020, series decomposition techniques and forecasts with 
ARIMAS and SARIMAS were implemented (Boot, Feibes, & Lisman, 1967). 
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financing typologies and trends that are partially related to those of 
organized crime and cartels. It also shows that the risk of terrorism 
financing in Mexico is low. Despite this, the comparison at the threshold 
of 50 shows how the proposed model could produce a smaller number of 
false positives through detecting real cases of terrorism financing. 
With the confusion matrixes, it is possible to calculate measures that 
allow us to compare the models more accurately. These measures are the 
error rate (ERR) and accuracy (ACC) rate. The error rate is calculated as 
the number of incorrect predictions divided by the total number of ob-
servations and expresses how badly the model predicts cases of money 
laundering and terrorism financing. The best error rate is 0 and the worst 
is 1. The accuracy rate is calculated as the total number of correct pre-
dictions divided by the total number of observations and expresses how 
well the model predicts true cases of money laundering and terrorism 
financing. The closer ACC is to 1, the more accurate is the model. When 
the test set is unbalanced, as in this study, a model that simply predicts 
that every testing data point is in the majority class would seem to have a 
high accuracy rate. To avoid this, a balanced accuracy (BACC) measure 
is used. Balanced accuracy is calculated as the average of the true pos-
itive and negative rates (Wei & Dunbrack, 2013). Thus, the measure 1- 
BACC is the balanced error rate (BERR). 
Tables 10 and 11 show the balanced error rate and accuracy rate for 
the detection of money laundering in natural and legal persons. In 
general terms, the proposed model is more accurate than the current 
model for both types of person, except for the threshold of 75 in legal 
persons. The error rate is also lower in the proposed model than in the 
current model for both types of person, except for the threshold of 75 in 
legal persons. 
Tables 12 and 13 show the balanced error and accuracy rates for the 
detection of terrorism financing by natural and legal persons. In general 
terms, the proposed model has the best performance for the threshold of 
50 based on both the error rate and accuracy rate. It is possible that, 
when the algorithm starts to be fed with real cases of terrorism 
financing, the difference will be more significant in other thresholds. 
The results show that including additional non-transactional vari-
ables and filtering by the indicator of abnormality leads to a lower 
number of false positives compared to the rule system used by the 
institution. 
It is important to note that natural persons represent around 98% of 
the total number of customers in any financial institution, including the 
institution in this article. Additionally, there are many more cases of 
suspected ML than suspected FT, and these require significant human 
capital, time and financial resources to conduct in-depth investigations. 
Thus, most of the efforts to detect these crimes are focused on cases 
involving natural persons and related to ML. The proposed model 
significantly reduces the number of false positives for natural persons 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics on the key variables for the training set.  
Variable Natural Persons ML  Legal Persons ML  Natural Persons FT  Legal Persons FT   
µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ 
Client N = 26,751  N = 3,527  N = 26,751  N = 3,527  
Age 48.86 21.38 47.44 21.35 24.65 13.12 20.49 11.63 
Source of Income 36.89 19.50 42.06 22.47 20.59 11.83 18.72 12.21 
Nationality 34.89 39.66 18.05 25.40 22.73 20.31 8.20 13.32 
Sense of Operativity 34.43 28.40 29.67 26.60 16.34 13.78 14.10 12.76 
Operations with the government 20.90 23.17 17.78 20.19 9.53 9.74 14.53 11.81 
Common Address 32.97 29.20 21.78 23.85 17.63 16.10 15.02 12.38 
Time of Relationship 44.66 36.31 23.75 16.76 27.65 18.65 10.98 8.90 
Client Segment 40.92 24.61 41.84 22.52 16.04 12.99 17.76 12.79 
Politically Exposed Person 25.69 33.71 17.24 24.24 13.03 17.29 13.70 12.48 
Economic Activity 40.20 25.77 46.66 29.23 21.88 14.20 21.48 15.40 
Suspicious Activity Report 29.41 22.93 31.48 23.02 14.72 11.37 15.83 11.27  
Product or Service         
Type of Product 36.83 19.81 33.43 16.09 20.55 12.00 14.18 8.47 
Type of Subproduct 24.96 23.75 32.80 32.42 12.66 12.52 14.96 15.76  
Transactions         
Type of Transaction 20.87 24.82 18.73 25.89 16.93 15.19 9.34 12.84 
Currency 40.03 24.69 35.87 21.41 20.10 13.13 13.98 9.79 
Monetary Instrument 41.66 26.00 43.41 25.73 24.83 14.16 19.53 13.29 
Channel 39.98 22.73 39.87 20.15 16.45 11.84 19.68 10.76 
Volatility of Amount 44.65 19.96 53.93 26.12 21.06 12.46 26.68 16.06 
Volatility of Operations 46.96 20.22 40.01 19.58 22.49 12.43 18.31 12.33 
Sum of amounts sent 30.60 21.24 33.33 19.97 15.57 10.53 17.16 9.98 
Sum of amounts received 31.31 22.00 33.76 20.16 15.92 10.77 17.33 10.10 
Num. transactions sent 34.81 24.59 30.81 23.88 18.84 12.19 16.78 12.01 
Num. transactions received 32.34 23.28 31.74 23.46 17.62 11.70 17.34 11.74 
R-S 32.92 19.79 31.05 19.22 16.96 10.02 16.07 9.75 
A-A 38.36 21.19 37.98 20.35 18.77 9.78 18.56 9.30  
Geographic Zones         
State of Residency 33.97 23.04 37.27 23.07 14.36 11.84 22.20 13.69 
State of Operation 42.11 22.66 51.29 24.98 16.94 12.23 29.04 15.83 
Municipality of Residency 40.35 36.74 32.43 35.12 18.69 16.58 18.27 18.47 
Municipality of Operation 48.82 36.37 52.26 36.25 21.99 17.48 28.37 19.02 
Country of Residency 22.79 31.07 16.42 22.93 10.70 16.29 13.30 11.75 
Source: Compiled by the authors. “µ” and “σ” are the mean and the standard deviation of the sample, respectively. “N” is the number of observations. 
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involved in ML and therefore the cost for the financial institution also 
decreases considerably. The methodology proposed has some advan-
tages over the traditional methods and previous models. First, it allows 
cases of money laundering and terrorism financing to be detected at the 
right moment in the transaction, preventing illegal resources from being 
further integrated into the financial system. Second, financial in-
stitutions can add as many variables and typologies as they desire. Thus, 
principal component analysis will express the information from the 
original variables in a smaller number of components, optimizing 
computational work. Third, although the test set requires some cases to 
validate the accuracy of the methodology, the training set does not. This 
allows the methodology to be replicated by financial institutions that do 
not have an adequate sample of real cases due to privacy policies and 
restrictions. Finally, the rarity or scarcity of actual cases of money 
laundering and terrorism financing does not represent a problem for the 
proposed methodology since the process of training and constructing the 
abnormality indicator is based on unsupervised techniques. 
6. Conclusions 
In this article, a new methodology has been proposed that considers 
the typologies that have been described in FATF reports but that had not 
been included in previous studies, improving the self-comparison. It also 
proposes an indicator of abnormality based on the variance of the 
variables and this enhances the group comparison in the clustering 
process. The results show a significant reduction in the number of false 
positives and greater accuracy compared to the previous rule-based 
method. 
Currently, the proposed model involves financial institutions 
analyzing cases using a threshold of 66.66, the same threshold used by 
the institution over the last 20 years under the previous method. The 
most significant benefits of the proposed model are the reduction in 
costs, human capital and research time due to the improvement in the 
prediction rate. 
Given the satisfactory results of this study, financial institutions are 
recommended to use all or some elements of this research to optimize 
the cost of crime detection by considerably reducing the number of false 
positives. Institutions are also recommended to be careful in relation to 
the limitations of this methodology. One of these is the extensive amount 
of information required on customer transactions. This information is 
often unavailable due to privacy policies or because the institution does 
not have a good data structure or data cleansing methodology. Another 
limitation of this methodology is the absence of confirmed cases of 
terrorism financing. This prevents us from seeing how the model would 
perform if it were applied in a country with real cases. 
Future research is aimed at applying the model in European and 
Middle Eastern countries to analyze whether the proposed methodology 
performs as well in detecting real cases of terrorism financing as it does 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics on the key variables for the test set.  
Variable Natural Persons ML  Legal Persons ML  Natural Persons FT  Legal Persons FT   
µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ 
Client N = 1,000  N = 600  N = 1,000  N = 600  
Age 77.16 29.34 81.83 25.78 41.44 17.60 40.48 14.96 
Source of Income 75.33 30.25 71.74 28.97 42.54 17.05 35.03 16.28 
Nationality 53.75 43.98 64.03 42.93 32.28 22.55 32.29 22.43 
Sense of Operativity 74.65 33.25 68.88 32.89 37.42 17.45 34.22 17.44 
Operations with the government 40.33 29.99 46.28 29.45 27.73 22.64 37.20 21.95 
Common Address 19.10 21.61 19.30 21.59 11.82 16.23 16.13 16.73 
Time of Relationship 73.25 36.29 58.62 39.07 42.34 18.69 29.32 20.59 
Client Segment 66.62 28.24 69.37 27.13 30.23 16.14 34.81 17.43 
Politically Exposed Person 62.90 43.13 62.71 43.25 32.09 22.11 36.89 22.18 
Economic Activity 68.85 33.37 76.00 28.60 38.33 19.02 37.52 15.95 
Suspicious Activity Report 33.38 21.93 30.31 20.93 16.51 10.96 16.06 11.54  
Product or Service         
Type of Product 39.32 17.45 38.22 16.33 22.38 10.90 16.70 9.04 
Type of Subproduct 63.59 33.83 61.72 33.27 34.36 19.45 29.40 17.74  
Transactions         
Type of Transaction 54.11 45.01 68.99 39.39 31.91 24.35 34.79 20.56 
Currency 63.38 29.89 74.09 25.96 33.97 17.42 34.83 14.69 
Monetary Instrument 73.67 29.87 72.74 35.91 42.13 16.13 36.22 19.42 
Channel 59.42 29.43 62.05 24.94 27.05 16.21 32.26 15.46 
Volatility of Amount 38.34 17.09 46.12 24.54 17.26 11.77 22.01 15.59 
Volatility of Operations 46.90 22.84 44.14 19.74 22.02 14.63 20.53 13.09 
Sum of amount sent 27.54 17.58 24.69 17.68 15.00 10.77 13.21 11.21 
Sum of amount received 30.76 19.01 33.49 21.35 16.60 11.26 17.85 11.80 
Num. transactions sent 28.17 27.85 37.19 31.35 17.10 17.79 22.43 20.40 
Num. transactions received 29.17 27.14 35.98 20.84 17.44 16.73 20.18 11.68 
R-S 37.18 23.45 32.34 19.90 19.89 13.90 17.82 11.70 
A-A 37.12 18.21 29.41 19.88 18.25 9.85 15.46 11.11  
Geographic Zones         
State of Residency 55.73 28.41 50.06 31.71 31.63 19.91 33.62 22.30 
State of Operation 32.46 17.77 36.97 21.09 12.43 10.62 20.64 14.56 
Municipality of Residency 56.15 40.05 71.72 31.11 30.17 21.89 42.60 18.70 
Municipality of Operation 33.73 33.76 49.84 38.09 16.32 19.04 28.70 21.91 
Country of Residency 65.11 42.63 54.20 44.08 36.01 24.72 35.07 25.03 
Source: Compiled by the authors. “µ” and “σ” are the mean and the standard deviation of the sample, respectively. “N” is the number of observations. 
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Fig. 2. Heat map of geographical risk index by state. 
Source: Compiled by the author. The geographic coordinates were plotted using QS software. The zones in red represent the areas of highest risk and those in blue the 
areas of lowest risk. 
Table 5 
CH index for the clustering process.  
CH Natural Persons ML Legal Persons ML Natural Persons FT Legal Persons FT 
Strict Competitive Learning  1.367  1.3077  1.4382  1.2621 
C-Means  3.4075  3.0816  3.4423  2.9202 
SOM  2.6586  2.6359  2.7645  2.6674 
Neural Gas  1.1197  1.1817  1.2044  1.1867 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Table 6 
Confusion matrix for natural persons in ML detection.  
Proposed Methodology    Current Methodology    
Threshold > 50    Threshold > 50      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 106 0 Real S 117 12  
U 156 738  U 509 362  
Threshold >=66.66    Threshold >=66.66      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 106 0 Real S 111 18  
U 32 862  U 465 406  
Threshold >=75    Threshold >=75      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 55 51 Real S 111 18  
U 16 878  U 403 468 
Source: Compiled by author. “S” means suspicious and “U” means unsuspicious. 
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Table 7 
Confusion matrix for legal persons in ML detection.  
Proposed Methodology    Current Methodology    
Threshold > 50    Threshold > 50      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 240 0 Real S 240 0  
U 118 242  U 146 214  
Threshold >=66.66    Threshold >=66.66      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 240 0 Real S 240 0  
U 49 311  U 121 239  
Threshold >=75    Threshold >=75      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 196 44 Real S 240 0  
U 45 315  U 86 274 
Source: Compiled by author. “S” means suspicious and “U” means unsuspicious. 
Table 8 
Confusion matrix for natural persons in FT detection.  
Proposed Methodology    Current Methodology    
Threshold > 50    Threshold > 50      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 22 5 Real S 26 1  
U 11 962  U 286 687  
Threshold >=66.66    Threshold >=66.66      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 0 27 Real S 0 27  
U 0 973  U 0 973  
Threshold >=75    Threshold >=75      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 0 27 Real S 0 27  
U 0 973  U 0 973 
Source: Compiled by author. “S” means suspicious and “U” means unsuspicious. 
Table 9 
Confusion Matrix for legal persons in FT detection.  
Proposed Methodology    Current Methodology    
Threshold > 50    Threshold > 50      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 19 6 Real S 21 4  
U 6 569  U 114 461  
Threshold >=66.66    Threshold >=66.66      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 0 25 Real S 0 25  
U 0 575  U 0 575  
Threshold >=75    Threshold >=75      
Predicted   Predicted     
S U   S U 
Real S 0 25 Real S 0 25  
U 0 575  U 0 575 
Source: Compiled by author. “S” means suspicious and “U” means unsuspicious. 
J.-d.-J. Rocha-Salazar et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Expert Systems With Applications 169 (2021) 114470
14
in detecting proxy cases (organized crime/cartels). The addition of the 
cryptocurrency variable would be an improvement in the model. Also, a 
similar methodology to detect financial resources destined or origi-
nating from human trafficking could be applied. Currently Mexico does 
not fully comply with the minimum standards to eliminate human 
trafficking but it is making efforts to do so. This makes financial in-
stitutions vulnerable to the flow of resources from this crime. When 
developing the methodology for the detection of human trafficking, its 
comparison with the algorithm proposed in this article for money 
laundering and terrorism financing would complement this line of 
research. 
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